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FACTS 
Appellees, and Mr. Wisan in particular, each proffer their own statement of facts. 
Aside from strenuously denying Mr. Wisan's allegation that Appellants have a "blatant 
disregard for the truth" (Wisan Br. 27) (together with any other assertion or implication 
that Appellants have not provided an accurate recitation of the facts), Appellants do not 
proffer additional facts beyond the allegations in their initial brief. Similarly, Appellants 
do not attempt to refute the allegations made by Appellees because the initial allegations 
in their motions must be taken as true. See Central States, S.E. & S. W. Areas Health & 
Welfare Fund v. Old Security Life Ins. Co., 600 F.2d 671, 679 (7th Cir. 1979) ("All 
nonconclusory allegations supporting a motion to intervene are taken as true, absent 
sham, frivolity, or other objections."); Hiles v. Null, 716 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (Ind. App. 
1999) ("In reviewing the trial court's exercise of its discretion [in denying or granting a 
motion to intervene], the facts alleged in the motion must be taken as true."). 
ARGUMENT 
L APPELLANTS' MOTIONS TO INTERVENE WERE TIMELY AND 
PROCEDURALLY ADEQUATE. 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that a party may intervene on 
"timely application." Courts determine whether an application for invention is timely 
based on the "facts and circumstances of each particular case." Jenner v. Real Estate 
Servs., 659 P.2d 1072, 1073 (Utah 1983). Appellants moved to intervene in the ongoing 
administration of the Trust at a time when such administration began to directly implicate 
their interests. Specifically, their motions promptly followed the filing of the Special 
0 ^ 8 0 0 A 
1 
Fiduciary's Motion for Relief to Preserve Trust Assets on May 5, 2009, which sought to 
divest the Trust of sacred FLDS land. (R. 15126-15128) Prior to that date, Appellants 
had objected to the sale, but their objections were overruled because they were not parties 
to the litigation. Shortly thereafter, a stay of litigation was imposed, and Appellants 
focused their efforts on negotiations with the aim of resolving all the outstanding issues 
involving the Trust. When those discussions failed, the Special Fiduciary filed the above 
motion, and it became clear that "the disposition of the action may as a practical matter 
impair or impede [Appellants'] ability to protect that interest " See Utah Rule of Civ. 
Pro. 24(a)(2). Appellants therefore immediately moved to intervene. 
Contrary to Appellees' arguments, the trial court's final order with regard to the 
reformation of the Trust does not bar Appellants' right to intervene. Appellees correctly 
note that intervention is generally not permitted after the entry of judgment. See Jenner, 
659 P.2d at 1074. Trust administration, however, is a continuous and ongoing process 
subject to continuing oversight by the court.1 Thus the reformation of the Trust is not 
analogous to a final judgment. The unique facts and circumstances of this case confirm 
this assertion. 
1
 This Court has previously recognized the unique nature of trust administration cases 
involving motions to intervene, noting that "[c]ourts generally have broader powers in 
trust cases making certain that trusts are properly administered." Nat 7 Parks and 
Conservation Ass 'n v. Board of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 922 n.l 1 (Utah 1993) 
(disagreed with by Utah Chapter of Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 148 P.3d 960 
(Utah 2006), on other grounds). 
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For example, the December 13, 2005 Memorandum Decision reveals the court's 
expectation of its own continued involvement in the Trust administration beyond the 
reformation of the Trust. Among other things, the court reserved the authority to 
"appoint appropriate substitutes" to the advisory board and to receive and consider 
regular reports from the Special Fiduciary. (R. 3478 at f^ 60) The court made no 
prediction about when its continued involvement would cease; instead it even 
contemplated the possibility that the Trust's administration would always be subject to 
judicial oversight. (R. 3477 at |^ 59 [describing the possibility of relinquishing is 
oversight of the administration of the Trust in terms of "if—and—when"]). 
The Trust instrument itself also confirms the court's expectation of continued 
involvement in the administration of the Trust. § 5.1.2 ("Until the Board receives 
complete authority for the administration of the Trust, the Court shall retain oversight 
over the Trust...."). Given the foregoing, it is evident that the reformation did not 
constitute a final judgment of the type contemplated by Jenner. The reformation did not 
end the case and bar timely intervention; instead, the reformation is merely one 
procedural facet of the continuing administration of the Trust. 
Appellees also complain (for the first time on appeal) that Appellants' motions to 
intervene were procedurally deficient because they were not accompanied by "an 
intervention complaint, or any other 'pleading.'" (Special Fiduciary Br. 41) In response 
to this argument three points should be made. First, none of the Appellees raised this 
objection below. By failing to preserve this argument at the trial court level, Appellees 
waived the right to make the argument now. See State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah Ct. 
94S80Q 4 
App. 1996) ("It is a well-established rule that a defendant who fails to bring an issue 
before the trial court is generally barred from raising it for the first time on appeal."). 
Appellees should not be permitted to divert this Court's attention from the legal merits of 
Appellants' motion based on a supposed technicality that wasn't noticed until it was too 
late to object. Second, Rule 24 does not on its face require an "intervention complaint;" 
it requires a "pleading" that makes clear the nature of the claim as to which intervention 
is sought. Third, Appellees' hyper-technical reading of the statute misses the point of the 
"pleading" requirement, which is "to provide the court and the parties with information 
regarding the "reasons for and necessity of [Appellants] intervention in this case." 
Hoopiiaina v. Williams, 2005 WL 614511 (Utah. App. 2005) (unpublished). 
Appellants' memoranda filed concurrently with their motions to intervene 
accomplished the purpose of the pleading requirement by providing the parties and the 
court the reason, necessity, and purpose of their proposed intervention, which was "to 
oppose the Fiduciary's Motion and protect the rights of the vast majority of Trust 
beneficiaries whose best interests they represent." (R. 15265-66) Even if Appellants' 
motion was technically deficient, the court and the parties were not prejudiced by the 
absence of an "intervention complaint," and all have joined issue on the merits of 
Appellants' motion without difficulty. 
Appellees' "form over substance" approach to this issue is inconsistent with both 
common sense and a number of federal court opinions interpreting the analogous federal 
provision in a way that accommodates mere technical defects. See 7c Charles Alan 
Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1914 at 
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519-20 (3d ed. 2007) ("a deserving applicant for intervention is not likely to be turned 
away because of a procedural blunder of no real significance"). Appellants' memoranda 
satisfied the "pleading" requirement. Appellees' argument on this issue, presented for the 
first time on appeal, is substantively incorrect and was waived. 
II. APPELLANTS ADEQUATELY AND ACCURATELY IDENTIFIED THE 
SCOPE OF THEIR PROPOSED INTERVENTION. 
Appellees criticize Appellants' motions to intervene on the ground that Appellants 
supposedly failed to identify the scope of their proposed intervention. Appellees tellingly 
characterize Appellants' desire to ensure the voice of the vast majority of Trust 
beneficiaries will be meaningfully heard as an effort to "interfere with on-going trust 
administration." (Special Fiduciary Br. 41 n. 23) It is the Attorneys General's failure to 
do their job objectively and without bias that necessitates the intervention. The scope of 
that intervention depends on future actions the Special Fiduciary might seek to take, and 
on whether the Attorneys General continue to acquiesce in the Special Fiduciary's "war" 
on the Trust beneficiaries. 
Appellants have made it clear that they seek first and foremost to protect Berry 
Knoll, a sacred site, from liquidation by the special fiduciary. Both memoranda state that 
Appellants sought to intervene to oppose the fiduciary's motion to sell Berry Knoll.2 
2
 Appellants memoranda both state that "It is for this reason that [Appellants]... move to 
intervene pursuant to Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to oppose the 




Appellants' memoranda mention Berry Knoll by name 23 and 26 times respectively.3 
The boundaries of the proposed intervention are narrowly and clearly drawn to the extent 
they can be at this juncture. 
Similarly, Appellees' concerns that Appellants are seeking to mount an improper 
collateral attack on the reformation of the Trust are unfounded. (Arizona A.G. Br. 16) If 
this Court grants intervention to Appellants, they would be subject to established law 
governing intervention and bound "accept the pending action as [they] find[] it." Lima v. 
Chambers, 657 P.2d 279, 285 (Utah 1982). Appellants should not be denied the relief 
they seek because of a concern that they might attempt to "unring the bell" with respect 
to the reformation of the Trust. See Hartley Pen Co. v. Lindy Pen Co., 16 F.R.D. 141, 
153 (D.C. Cal. 1954). Appellants' pleadings make plain the fact that they seek to 
intervene "to maintain a proceeding to enforce the trust" (Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-
405(3)); their private beliefs regarding the propriety of the Trust reformation cannot form 
the basis for denying Appellants' motion because any legal actions after intervention will 
be circumscribed by applicable law. 
Of course, as the case moves forward, if Appellees proceed with stated plans to 
dispose of additional Trust assets, depending on the particular assets or other interests at 
issue, Appellants, as parties, may seek to set forth their position on such additional 
3
 The Brief of the Utah Attorney General acknowledges awareness of Appellants' purpose 
for intervention. See pg. 18 ("In their motion to intervene, memoranda, and brief and 
appeal, Appellants repeatedly make it clear that they want to intervene in order to voice 
their opposition to the proposed sale of the Berry Knoll Farm."). 
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matters (up to and including advocating the removal of the Special Fiduciary if the facts 
warrant such removal). A major problem with the trial court proceedings to date has 
been the absence of any balanced perspective on the various issues that have arisen, and 
one would think both the trial court and the other parties would welcome Appellants' 
participation as parties to ensure their important perspective is no just heard but given 
some weight. But this Court need not now decide the precise scope and limits of 
Appellants' proper role as intervening parties; it is enough that they clearly meet the 
requirements of Rule 24 with respect to the proposed sale of Berry Knoll based on their 
historic and, until recently, continuing use of the property for the benefit of the larger 
community. 
IEL THIS APEAL IS NOT MOOT. 
Appellees assert that Appellants' motions to intervene were mooted when the trial 
court granted a "hearing" to allow parties with an interest in the case to "express their 
views on the proposed sale of the Berry Knoll Farm." (Utah A.G.'s Br. 18) "An appeal 
is moot if during the pendency of the appeal circumstances change so that the controversy 
is eliminated, thereby rendering the relief requested impossible or of no legal effect." 
State v. Lay cock, 2009 UT 53, ^ 12. The limited "relief the trial court allowed does not 
render the relief Appellants seek impossible or of no effect. 
Appellants moved to intervene because they seek protection afforded them and all 
litigants by the full array of constitutional due process rights that attend party status. The 
trial court has repeatedly made it clear that, although Appellants may be allowed to 
"participate" in the proceeding, that limited role is offered as "a courtesy to interested 
945809.4 n 
individuals... and should not be misunderstood to imply that the Court recognizes those 
individuals as having standing in the case." (Corrected Ruling and Order on Pending 
Motions, n. 1 [Judge Lindberg's July 17, 2009 Order is absent from the record]) Thus it 
is simply incorrect to assert that Appellants have "received exactly what they asked for." 
(Utah A.G.'s Br. 18) What they asked for was the right to intervene as a party to an 
ongoing court proceeding. Part and parcel with party status is the right to appeal adverse 
rulings, the right to offer testimony under oath, the right to question witnesses, the right 
to engage in discovery, the right to notice and the opportunity to be heard, and the right to 
invoke the rules of civil procedure to help vindicate one's rights. The court's informal 
July 29, 2009 hearing, at which no sworn testimony was offered, no exhibits entered, and 
no other evidence adduced, is no substitute for intervention and its associated due process 
guarantees. Crucially, the meeting did not address Appellants' right to intervene. That 
issue still awaits decision; thus this appeal "has not lost its ability to provide judicial 
relief to the litigants." Baker v. Stevens, 114 P.3d 580, 583 (Utah 2005) (internal citation 
and punctuation omitted). 
Given the significant differences between formal intervention and the July 29, 
2009 hearing, it is obvious why Appellants are unsatisfied with their opportunity to 
"express their views on the proposed sale." The potential denial of Appellants' rights in 
Berry Knoll following what was in effect more akin to an informational town hall 
meeting than a judicial proceeding raises legitimate due process concerns. Satisfying due 
process requires more than a mere opportunity to be heard, it requires that interested 
persons be given an opportunity to be heard in "meaningful manner." Brigham Young 
945809.4 8 
University v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 156 P.3d 782, 788 (Utah 2007). The "abstract 
constitutional promise of due process" is given "operational expression" by the rules of 
civil procedure. Id. Because the July 29, 2010 hearing was informal and devoid of 
important procedural safeguards that would accompany intervenor status, Appellants and 
this Court cannot be assured that Appellants' rights were fully protected. Thus although 
the court's informal hearing may have provided input for Judge Lindberg and allowed 
Appellants and others to express their views, it did not moot this appeal. 
The Arizona Attorney General, in a similar vein, argues that Appellants' 
participation with counsel at July 29, 2009 hearing adequately protected Appellants' 
rights for due process purposes, thus mitigating any prejudice to Appellants. (Arizona 
A.G. Br. 41) The Attorney General provides several cases in support of this proposition; 
however, those cases are factually distinguishable from this case, either because they 
provided procedural protections to the proposed intervenors that were not provided to 
Appellants or because of the nature of the case.4 See Securities and Exchange 
Commission v. Charles Plohn & Co., 448 F.2d 546, 549 (2nd Cir. 1971) (proposed 
intervenors were allowed to file papers, submit, proof, and be heard on oral argument); 
4
 Three of three of the four cases cited by the Arizona Attorney General on this point 
involve S.E.C. enforcement actions in which intervention is generally disfavored. See 
S.E.C v. Beyers, 109 F.R.D. 299, 302 (W.D. Pa. 1985) ("Further, at least where 
permissive intervention is sought, it has been held to be improper in an SEC enforcement 
action."); S.E.C v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 194 F.R.D. 457, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("it is 
worth noting that the majority of courts to have considered the subject of investor 
intervention under analogous circumstances have denied intervention."). Given this 
distinction, the instructive value of these cases is diminished. 
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U.S. v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 992 (2nd Cir. 1984) ("The 
judge was prepared to allow appellants, as amici, to call their own witnesses and to cross-
examine the witnesses of the settlement's proponents."). Informal proceedings are not an 
adequate substitute for formal intervention which provides, among other things, the right 
to appeal adverse rulings. See U.S. v. City of Los Angeles, CaL, 288 F.3d 391, 400 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (amicus status held to be insufficient protector of proposed intervenor's rights 
because it gives no right "to raise issues or arguments formally and gives it no right of 
appeal."). 
IV. APPELLANTS HAVE STANDING TO ENFORCE THE TRUST. 
In holding that Appellants lacked standing to enforce the Trust, the trial court 
failed to undertake the analysis necessary to determine whether Appellants are specially 
interested beneficiaries and thus have standing pursuant to a well-established exception to 
the general rule that grants standing only to state attorneys general as representatives of 
the public. The trial court's failure in this regard stems from its conclusion, without 
analysis, that Appellants are mere potential beneficiaries and that as such they 
categorically have no right to make any claim with respect to any Trust property. The 
briefs submitted by Appellees similarly fail to address the unique circumstances in this 
case that show that Appellants have the requisite special relationship. 
As a general rule, individuals who merely believe they may stand to gain from a 
public charitable trust may not sue to enforce the trust. See Ronald Chester and George 
Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 414 at 47 (3rd ed. 2005) ("Bogert"). This prohibition 
makes sense insofar as the potential beneficiaries are not distinguishable from the public 
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generally. Because such individuals have no particularized relationship to any specific 
trust asset or even to the overarching purpose of the trust, they "can be described as 
beneficiaries in a loose sense only. . . ." Id. Given the general public's remote claim on 
the assets of charitable trusts, courts generally vest the enforcement power for such trusts 
in the state's attorney general with the aim of avoiding numerous lawsuits. In this case 
however, the Trust is by all accounts a private, not a public charitable trust. This factual 
distinction is essential in evaluating standing claims but was ignored by the trial court and 
by Appellees. See Gray v. St. Matthews Cathedral Endowment Fund, 544 S. W.2d 488, 
490 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1976) ("In reality, the standing of individuals to enforce a 
charitable trust depends upon whether the trust is a Public or a Private charity."). 
Differentiating between a public charitable trust and a private charitable trust is 
accomplished by consulting the plain language of the trust instrument. "Where a 
charitable gift is for the benefit of some particular person, corporation, or class of 
persons, as distinguished from the public generally, then that would be a private charity, 
and the beneficiary or beneficiaries, of course, could enforce the execution of the trust." 
Carrollv. City of Beaumont, 18 S.W.2d 813, 819 (Tex Civ. App. 1929). According to 
the foregoing definition, the Trust is a private charitable trust. By its own terms, the 
Trust benefits only a very tiny minority of the public at large, i.e. those "(1) who can 
demonstrate that they had previously made Contributions to either the Trust or the FLDS 
Church; or (2) who subsequent to the date of this Agreement make documented 
945809.4 
Contributions to the Trust which Contributions are approved by the Board."5 Trust, § 
4.2. 
Because the Trust is intended to benefit a narrow, identifiable group of 
individuals, the specter of vexatious lawsuits evaporates. See Gray, 544 S.W.2d at 491 
("the problems of identification of beneficiaries and of undue harassment are not present 
with the class of persons to be benefitted is a small, easily identifiable group, as 
distinguished from the public generally."). That the Trust benefits financial contributors 
to a church is also significant. Bogert singles out church members as individuals with a 
special interest necessary to maintain standing to seek enforcement of a church related 
trust. In Bogert's words: 
if a trust exists for the benefit of a specified local church, or to advance the cause 
of religion through support of that local church, the members and pewholders of 
that church have a rather certain and definite interest in the enforcement of the 
trust. Though the benefits will go to all in the community who elect to take 
advantage of the services, and also to the general public, it is nearly certain that all 
the members of the church will obtain some advantage. Therefore, a number of 
courts have allowed a church member or pewholder in such a case to sue to 
enforce the trust's charitable purpose. 
Trusts and Trustees § 414 at 56 (3rd ed. 2005) (citing cases). Notwithstanding this and 
other persuasive authority, Appellees contend that Appellants do not satisfy the multi-
factor test adopted by some courts to determine whether a party has a special interest 
5
 It appears unlikely that the group of beneficiaries described in Subsection (2) is likely to 
increase in any material way in the near future. See Report of the Special Fiduciary 
Dated December 31, 2009 f 313 (describing the primary source of income during the past 
16 months as having been "the receipt of monthly assessment payments from those 
residing upon Trust property." Which income "has not been sufficient to meet the 
ongoing expenses of the Trust "). 
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necessary to afford standing to enforce a charitable trust.6 Appellees' arguments on this 
point are unpersuasive. 
First, the class of potential beneficiaries "is sharply defined and limited in 
number." Hooker v. Edes Home, 579 A.2d 608, 614 (D.C. Ct. App. 1990). Appellees 
contend that thousands of FLDS members constitute a class that is too large to qualify for 
the special interest exception. This argument misses the point of this analytical factor, 
which is that the putative class of beneficiaries need only be "a small, identifiable group, 
as distinguished from the public generally." Id. (emphasis added). In Hooker, the 
appellants filed a class action giving rise to the case "on behalf of themselves and a class 
of all 'eligible potential residents of Edes' numbering 'in the hundreds, if not the 
thousands.'" Id. at 611; see also Gray, 544 S.W.2d at 491 (standing granted to one 
church member despite class of beneficiaries consisting of 1,300 parishioners); Stern v. 
Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'I Sch. of Deaconesses and Missionaries, 367 F. Supp. 536, 540-41 
(D.C. 1973) (granting party standing to representatives of a class of 10,000 hospital 
patients under the special interest theory). 
In spite of the existence of potentially thousands of beneficiaries, the Hooker court 
held that a class consisting of aged and indigent widows, in a certain region, with a five 
6
 The relevant factors include "(1) the nature of the benefitted class and its relationship to 
the charity; (2) the extraordinary nature of the acts complained of and the remedy sought; 
(3) the state attorney general's availability or effectiveness to enforce the trust; (4) the 
presence of fraud or misconduct on the part of the defendants; and (5) subjective and 
case-specific circumstances." See Robert Shalkenbach Fdn. v. Lincoln Fdn.f Inc., 91 
P.3d 1019, 1026 (Ariz. App. 2004) (internal citation omitted). 
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year track record of good health, was "sharply defined and limited in number." Hooker•, 
579 A.2d at 610, 614. The potential class in this case is arguably more sharply defined, 
consisting only of past or future contributors to the Trust. 
Appellees also contend that Appellants have failed to establish a "fixed" or 
"certain right" to receive benefits because distribution of benefits under the Trust is 
subject to the discretion of the trustee. (Arizona A.G. Br. 30) Appellees' reading of the 
rule is unduly harsh and overly restrictive. The fact that beneficiary status is contingent 
on Board approval is inapposite. See id. at 614 (rejecting the trustee's argument that "a 
person has no standing to sue the trust unless he or she has been chosen as a beneficiary, 
even though he or she may meet the threshold requirements of eligibility."). Were this 
actually the case, the Board could simply "confer or deny standing to question their 
actions" by unilaterally refusing to deny standing to dissatisfied but otherwise eligible 
beneficiaries. See id. This is an unacceptable result. See id. ("The better reasoned view . 
. . is that a particular class of potential beneficiaries has a special interest in enforcing a 
trust if the class is sharply defined and its members are limited in number."). 
Appellees also incorrectly assert that Appellants are not entitled to standing 
because they do not have preferential status under the Trust and have conflicts with other 
potential beneficiaries. (Utah A.G. Br. 27) Both observations, even if true, are 
irrelevant. Although Appellants have the support and endorsement of approximately 
3,000 FLDS believers, this type of consensus is not essential to standing. Indeed, the 
court in Gray granted standing to one of 1,300 parishioners who apparently made no 
claims to possessing unanimous support. Gray, 544 S.W.2d at 491-92 (while the court 
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granted intervention to Gray "in the lawsuit in his own behalf and as the representative of 
the parishioners as a class" Gray brought suit on his own behalf only). Preferential status 
under the Trust is similarly not required. See id. at 491 ("Appellees maintain that 
appellant must have an interest different from [t]he other parishioners in order to have 
standing, but that is not the requirement. He must have an interest [different from that of 
the public at large. He need not have an interest different from the other parishioners or 
pewholders."). 
Second, Appellants' intervention was prompted by the proposed sale of Berry 
Knoll—an extraordinary and fundamental act that, if allowed, will permanently divest the 
Trust of a spiritually significant and irreplaceable piece of real property, in part, for the 
purpose of paying professional fees incurred by the Special Fiduciary. Despite clear and 
unmistakable language in Appellants' memoranda, Appellees claim the true purposes of 
Appellants' motions are to "usurp the oversight authority of the district court . . . [ , ] to 
micro-manage the daily administration of the Trust contrary to section 75-7-20 l(2)(b)" 
(Utah A.G. Br. 28), and to "influence the daily operations of the [Trust]." (Arizona A.G. 
Br. 26) Appellees' allegations wrongly assume that the proposed sale of Berry Knoll is 
an act of ordinary discretion as opposed to a fundamental act. 
In Hooker, the court differentiated between challenges to recurring issues that fall 
within the "ordinary exercise of discretion on a matter expressly committed to the 
trustees" and those issues that "will only be litigated once." 579 A.2d at 615, 616. 
Divesting the Trust of Berry Knoll constitutes a permanent change to the nature of the 
Trust which would deprive thousands of FLDS faithful of access to valuable land which 
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they consider sacred. Appellants' attempt to intervene to stop the sale of this property is 
not an attempt to micromanage the daily administration of the Trust. Instead, it is an 
attempt to protect land that has been held by the FLDS for over three decades and that 
has been designated as a temple site. Given the history, spiritual significance, and 
permanent nature of the proposed sale, it is not hyperbolic to say that the Special 
Fiduciary, the courts, and the Trust beneficiaries presently "stand at a crossroads they are 
unlikely to face again." Id. at 617. Intervention is required to allow beneficiaries under 
the Trust to challenge such a fundamental and extraordinary act.7 
Third, the Arizona and Utah Attorneys General have failed to protect the interests 
of the FLDS as they relate to Berry Knoll. This point is made clear by the Attorneys 
General's strident opposition to Appellants' motion to intervene and to this appeal. 
Given the diffidence or outright hostility manifest in the words and actions (or lack of 
actions) of the Attorneys General, Appellants felt compelled to bring this action to 
articulate their own claims and those of the thousands of other Trust beneficiaries whose 
voices are otherwise not being heard. Such action is appropriate and consistent with their 
special interest. See Gray, 544 S.W.2d at 492 ("[AJlthough the attorney general is a 
party, his representation of the remote interest of the public at large cannot be considered 
7
 The fact that the sale of Trust assets is not ultra vires is immaterial. Although Appellees 
correctly observe that Section 5.35 of the Trust authorizes the distribution or sale of Trust 
property (Utah A.G. Br. 28), this does not mean the Special Fiduciary's exercise of this 
authority is an ordinary day-to-day discretionary act. See Hooker, 579 A.2d at 616 
(noting that the sale of Edes House was charged to the trustee's discretion but was 
nevertheless extraordinary). 
945809.4 1 H 
as representation of the special interests of appellant and the other parishioners."). 
Because the interests of Appellants with respect to the Trust are distinct from the public 
at large, one should not expect the Attorneys General's representation of them to be 
adequate. The loyalties of the Attorneys General properly lie with the general citizenry 
of their respective states. This inherent conflict of interest supports intervention to allow 
Appellants to protect their own interests in court. 
Fourth, the acts complained of include fraudulent and criminal conduct. In 
response to the allegations of fraud described in Appellants' brief, the Arizona Attorney 
General complains of a lack of proof of such fraud (but acknowledges the existence of a 
trespassing conviction of a fiduciary representative). (Arizona A.G. Br. 29) Because the 
parties have conflicting views regarding the existence of such fraudulent and criminal 
acts, it is important to put this analytical factor in context. First, Appellants are aware of 
no case law requiring proof of fraud as a prerequisite to grant standing. Scholarly 
authority relied upon by both sides, speaks of the fraud element in terms of alleged fraud 
as well as established fraud. Mary Grace Blasko, Curt S. Crossley, David Lloyd, 
Standing to Sue in the Charitable Sector, 28 U.S.F.L.Rev. 37, 41-47 (Fall 1993) 
("Blasko") ("a close examination of the case law reveals simply that courts have a 
tendency to grant standing more often in cases where fraud or misconduct is alleged than 
in those where it is not."). Second, the presence or absence of fraud allegations is 
thought to be the least important analytical factor; therefore, any perceived problems of 
proof are not determinative and should be resolved at the trial court level. See Robert 
Shalkenbach Fdn. v. Lincoln Fdn., Inc., 91 P.3d 1019, 1026 n.7 (Ariz. App. 2004) ("We 
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give little, if any, weight to the nature of the acts complained of and whether there are 
any allegations of fraud "). 
Appellants' allegations of fraud are not made lightly and the existence of criminal 
conduct by an agent of the fiduciary is conclusively proven. Thus this factor weighs in 
favor of Appellants. 
Finally, subjective case-specific factors weigh in favor of recognizing Appellants' 
standing to intervene. Legal scholars surveying cases regarding this factor note that 
"[although courts rarely acknowledge it, the social desirability of a suit will often play a 
role in the decision-making process." Blasko, 28 U.S.F.L.Rev. at 74. The sale of land 
having distinct religious significance to thousands of individuals, in part, to pay recently 
incurred professional fees, has severe social and public policy considerations that are 
worthy of this Court's consideration. 
V. APPELLANTS ARE LEGALLY ENTITLED TO INTERVENE. 
Appellants' motions satisfy the requirements of Rule 24, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. First, as described in Point II (above), Appellants motion was timely. Second, 
Appellants' special interest in the enforcement of the Trust satisfies the "claim of 
interest" requirement. See Gray, 544 S.W.2d at 491 (granting motion to intervene based 
on a showing of special interest under the common law of trusts). Third, Appellants are 
"so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede 
[their] ability to protect that interest." Rule 24(a), Utah R. Civ. P. It is axiomatic that if 
sacred FLDS land is sold to other parties, some of whom are groups who may have 
competing truth claims, that their ability to protect their interest will be impaired or 
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impeded, if not completely eliminated. Fourth, Appellants' interests are not adequately 
represented by existing parties. 
Predictably, both Attorneys General claim that they are adequately representing 
the interests of the Appellants. As noted however, adequate representation is effectively 
impossible given the divergent interests of the citizens of Utah and Arizona and 
Appellants. See Forest Conservation Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489, 1493 
(9th Cir. 1993) ("Inadequate representation is most likely to be found when the applicant 
asserts a personal interest that does not belong to the general public." [quoting 3B 
Moore's Federal Practice, ^ 24.07[4] at 24-78 (2d ed. 1995)]); Mille Lacs Band of 
Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 989 F.2d 994, 1000-01 (8th Cir. 1993) ("Because the 
[proposed intervenors] seek to protect local and individual interests not shared by the 
general citizenry of Minnesota, no presumption of adequate representation arises. The 
proposed intervenors need only carry a minimal burden of showing inadequate 
representation."). 
Only a minority of the citizens of either Utah or Arizona has an interest in 
maintaining the sanctity of FLDS holy sites. The Arizona Attorney General implicitly 
acknowledges this tension in his brief: "the interest of Arizona and Utah citizens are 
being affirmatively and independently represented by the advocacy of the Attorneys 
General of their states. Again, it is not necessary to recognize any 'special interest' to 
protect those with a potential interest in trust benefits." (Arizona A.G. Br. 28) Although 
it is debatable whether the citizens of Utah and Arizona are being adequately represented, 
it is clear that the unique interests of Appellants are taking a backseat while the 
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"sociological and psychological war with the beneficiaries of the Trust" rages on. (R. 
11660-11879) For this reason, Appellants need to intervene to protect their own interests 
where the Attorneys General simply cannot. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in denying Appellants' Motions to Intervene in the trial court 
action. Appellants satisfy the requirements of Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and they have a "special interest" in the Trust and specific assets currently at 
issue in the trial court action. Appellants respectfully request that this Court reverse the 
trial court's denial of Appellants' Motions to Intervene and remand this case to the trial 
court with the instruction that Appellants be added and allowed to participate as parties. 
DATED this Jjg_ day of September, 2010. 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH P.C. 
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